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This paper examines the factors that determine banking 
flows from advanced economies to emerging markets. 
In addition to the usual determinants of capital flows in 
terms of global push and local pull factors, it examines 
the role of bilateral factors, such as growth differentials 
and economic size, as well as contagion factors and 
measures of the depth in financial interconnectedness 
between lenders and borrowers. The analysis finds 
profound differences across regions. In particular, in 
This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Europe and Central Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by 
the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be 
contacted at sghosh@worldbank.org, nsugawara@worldbank.org, and jzalduendo@worldbank.org.  
spite of the severe impact of the global financial crisis, 
banking flows in emerging Europe stand out as a more 
stable region than is the case in other developing regions. 
Assuming that the determinants of banking flows 
remain unchanged in the presence of structural changes, 
the authors use these results to explore the short-term 
implications of Basel III capital regulations on banking 
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Banking Flows and Financial Crisis—Financial Interconnectedness and Basel III Effects
* 
 
I.  Introduction 
The  global  financial  crisis  has  led  to  a  range  of  reform  proposals  concerning  the 
regulatory  framework  governing  the  banking  sector  with  a  view  to  enhancing  its  resilience.  
Agreement has already been reached on some aspects of these new rules, which are collectively 
referred to as Basel III (Appendix 1).  The proposed new regulations cover both micro-prudential 
or  firm-specific  measures,  as  well  as  macro-prudential  measures  aimed  at  strengthening  the 
resilience of the banking system as a whole by addressing the pro-cyclicality of banking and 
limiting the risks arising from the interconnectedness among financial institutions.  One of the 
cornerstones of the proposed reforms relates to strengthening the level and quality of the capital 
base through an increase in the minimum common equity requirement from 2.0 percent to 4.5 
percent of assets and the introduction of a capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent of assets.  
Within  the  proposed  macro-prudential  reforms,  agreement  has  also  been  reached  on  the 
introduction of counter-cyclical capital buffers.  To contain the excessive buildup of leverage, 
agreement has also been reached on introducing an internationally harmonized leverage ratio 
threshold that could serve as a backstop to the capital measure and on a new global minimum 
liquidity standard.  
Although the proposed reforms are expected to generate substantial benefits (namely, by 
reducing the frequency and intensity of banking crises), concerns have been raised that, in the 
short term, the costs of moving to higher capital ratios may lead banks to raise their lending rates 
and reduce lending.
1  In particular, if these regulations are implemented over a short period of 
time, there could be  a consequent drag on the economic recovery in countries adopting these 
regulations as well as in those emerging markets closely dependent on global banking flows. 
Against this background, this paper examines the determinants of  banking flows from 
advanced economies to emerging markets.  It focuses primarily on the nature of the financia l 
linkages between these countries after controlling for global push and local pull factors, as well 
as aggregate bilateral linkages.  These results are then used to assess the possible impact  on 
emerging markets of the regulatory changes under Basel III.  We focus primarily on the financial 
flows channel; that is, the impact on banking flows through both direct and indirect lending. 
 
                                                           
* Background paper prepared as background to a forthcoming World Bank report titled ―Golden Growth: Restoring 
the Lustre of the European Economic Model.‖ The authors wish to thank the useful comments received from Stijn 
Claessens, Swapan-Kumar Pradhan, Bryce Quillin, and Sophie Sirtaine; of course all errors are our exclusive 
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Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The authors may be contacted at 
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1 Banks can meet higher capital ratios in three ways: (1) issuing new equity; (2) increasing retained earnings through 
a number of measures (by reducing dividend payments, enhancing operating efficiency, raising average margins 
between borrowing and lending rates, and increasing non-interest (fee) income); and (3) reducing their risk-weighted 
assets by lowering the size of loan portfolios, reducing or selling non-loan assets, and shifting their balance sheet 
towards less risky assets. 3 
 
II.  Literature Review 
Three related strands of work have analyzed capital flows to developing countries.  The 
first strand has focused on the relative roles of external (or push) factors and of domestic (or 
pull) factors underlying capital flows to emerging markets.   The second strand of work has 
attempted to explain the so-called Lucas paradox (1990).  Specifically, neoclassical theory would 
predict that, given the higher marginal product of capital in developing countries, capital should 
flow from rich (high capital per worker) countries to poor (low capital per worker) countries. In 
reality, however, these flows are much lower than would be expected.  The third strand has 
focused exclusively on understanding banking flows, including their role in contagion in crises. 
Numerous studies have focused on the role of push and pull factors in explaining capital 
flows to developing countries and have arrived at different conclusions with respect to their 
relative importance.  One of the earliest articles analyzing the relative importance of push and 
pull factors in explaining capital flows is that by Calvo et al. (1993).  They find that while 
domestic factors were important in explaining investment flows to Latin America in the early 
1990s,  the  substantial  co-movement  in  macroeconomic  variables—such  as  between  the  real 
exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve flows—suggest the influence of common (external) 
variables.    Fernandez-Arias  (1996)  looks  at  portfolio  flows  using  an  analytic  model  of 
international  portfolio  investment  that  he  tests  on  a  representative  panel  of  middle-income 
countries.  He finds that external factors are important in explaining portfolio flows. Kim (2000) 
uses structural decomposition analysis in four developing countries, and Ying and Kim (2001) 
use a VAR model to investigate the underlying shocks causing the capital inflows to Korea and 
Mexico;  again,  external  factors  are  found  to  be  important  in  explaining  these  flows.    In 
particular, the latter study finds that US business cycle and foreign interest rates accounted for 
over 50 percent of the capital inflows to Korea and Mexico during the late 1980s and 1990s.  
Several  other  authors,  however,  have  found  that  domestic  factors—growth,  inflation, 
trade openness, political stability, domestic savings and investment rates—play a more important 
role in determining capital inflows.  For instance Hernandez and Rudolph (1995) examine total 
private  capital  flows  (FDI,  portfolio  and  loans)  and  find  that  domestic  factors  that  reflect  a 
country’s investment attractiveness (domestic investment and savings rates, and export growth) 
are important in explaining the flows to 22 developing countries during 1986-93.  Chuhan et al. 
(1993) look at portfolio flows (bond and equity) and find that domestic and external factors were 
equally important in explaining flows to Latin America, but that domestic factors tended to be 
much more important in explaining flows to Asia.  Bohn and Tesar (1996) look at US equity 
investments and also find domestic factors to be important.  Finally, the World Bank (1997) 
suggests that the factors driving flows to emerging markets have changed over time and that the 
domestic factors became more important in the mid-1990s as compared to the early 1990s.  
The work related to the Lucas paradox has followed from the theoretical explanations and 
can be grouped into two broad categories.  The first category attributes the limited amount of 
capital inflows to developing countries to differences in fundamentals that affect the production 
structure of the economy, such as technological differences, factors of production, government 
policies, and institutions.  The second category of explanations focuses on international capital 
market imperfections, mainly sovereign risk and asymmetric information that increase the level 
of uncertainty associated with the expected returns from investing in developing countries.  4 
 
Empirical  work that falls  under the first  group of explanations  of the Lucas  paradox 
includes  Edwards  (1991)  who  shows  that  government  size  and  openness  are  important 
determinants of inward FDI from OECD to developing countries during 1971-87. Wei (2000) 
and Wei and Wu (2002), who use data on bilateral FDI flows from 18 industrialized source 
countries to 59 host countries during 1994-96, find that corruption reduces the volume of inward 
FDI.  In addition, Alfaro et al. (2005) find, based on a cross-section of developed and developing 
countries, that institutional quality is an important determinant of capital flows and that policies 
play a significant role in explaining the changes in the level of capital over time.  Under the 
second group of explanations, Portes and Rey (2005) find evidence that imperfections in the 
international credit markets can affect the amount and direction of capital flows while Lane 
(2004) finds that credit market frictions are a determinant of debt flows during 1970-95.  More 
recently, a study by Kinda (2007) has combined the two approaches, in effect extending the 
Lucas paradox approach that considers only economic fundamentals (education, institutions) by 
including capital market imperfections and integrating the external factors of the ―push-pull‖ 
literature.  The focus of this paper is primarily on physical and financial infrastructure, with the 
finding that physical and financial development has a significant positive effect on FDI and 
portfolio investments respectively for a sample of 61 developing countries during 1970-2003. 
Finally, the literature on cross-border flows has focused both on the determinants of these 
flows as well as their role in contagion.  Among the literature that focused primarily on the 
factors that affect cross-border flows, it is worth noting the work by Ferrucci et al. (2004).  They 
look at bank lending based on data from BIS reporting banks’ lending flows to ten EME debtor 
economies  and  find  that  external  factors  were  important  determinants  of  this  lending.    Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2003) are among the first that emphasize not only push and pull factors, 
but also common lender effects.  Specifically, they look at the exposure of lending countries on a 
country  facing  a  capital  account  crisis  and  how  that  might  impact  their  exposures  on  other 
countries.  Relatedly, McGuire and Tarashev (2008) link cross-border flows to the health of the 
banking systems in both the source country as well as the recipient country.  Herrmann and 
Mihaljek (2010) look at a a number of domestic and external factors, and emphasize in particular 
bilateral  linkages  by  emphasizing  gravity-type  regressors;  namely,  language  and  distance. 
Herrero and Martínez Pería (2007) emphasize macroeconomic conditions in the recipient country 
and  Papaioannou  (2008)  emphasize  the  role  of  institutional  factors.    Finally,  Kaminski  and 
Reinhart (2000) emphasized that cross-border flows play an important role in the transmission of 
crisis—and in fact more important than trade flows.  This is in line with Calvo et al. (2008) who 
also emphasize that financial linkages increased the probability of crisis. 
 
III.  Background on Basel III 
The range of estimates on the potential short-term impacts on lending rates, volumes and 
economic activity of adopting Basel III is quite broad.  Two such estimates are the ones put 
forward by the Macro Assessment Group (MAG, 2010) and the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF a, 2010).  Based on models covering 17 countries, the MAG report finds that the median 
estimated increase in lending spreads is roughly 15 basis points by 2015 in response to a 1 
percentage point increase in the target ratios over four years.  The IIF report, which looks at the 
Euro area, Japan and the United States,  assumes a 2 percentage point increase in the target 
capital ratio (reflecting both the increase in capital adequacy ratios and the introduction of new 5 
 
liquidity standards) and it finds that this results in an increase in the average lending spread of 
132 basis points during 2011-15.   
In  part,  these  differences  in  estimates  reflect  differences  in  the  regulatory  changes 
assumed: whereas the MAG study focuses largely on the impact of a higher regulatory capital 
ratio, the  IIF study also considers redefinition  effects,  higher trading  book capital,  and  a (1 
percentage point) countercyclical buffer.  In fact, some market participants expect the effective 
increase in core Tier 1 capital requirements under the new rules (when all the capital related 
charges are taken into account, not simply those of the higher regulatory capital ratio) to be more 
than 2 percentage points, perhaps as high as 6 percentage points
2.  As highlighted by Slovik and 
Cournède (2011), the increase in capitalization will also depend on whether banks would fully 
maintain their current discretionary capital buffers above the regulatory minima.   For instance, 
the MAG report assumes that the current benchmark level of common equity ratio is 5.7 percent 
of risk-weighted assets and will need to increase by 1.3 percentage points to meet the required 7 
percent of risk-weighted assets by the end of the implementation period —thus,  it  does  not 
incorporate the discretionary capital buffers into the changes introduced by Basel III.  
The  broad  range  of  estimates  also  reflects  different  assumptions  regarding  the 
implementation period.  This matters because the ―stock‖ costs and ―flow‖ costs of increasing 
capital differ.  The ―stock costs‖ of holding more equity on the balance sheets arise from factors 
such as taxes and agency conflicts that make equity capital more expensive regardless of how 
that equity comes on to the balance sheet (i.e., regardless of whether the equity is accumulated 
through new issuances or retained earnings).  The ―flow costs‖ are associated with the process of 
reaching the new capital ratios.  Many observers have argued that the stock costs of holding 
more equity may not be very significant because, even though equity is more risky and thus 
costly, these risks (and hence costs) are likely to fall as banks deleverage.
3  In contrast, the flow 
costs will depend in part on the length of time given for implementation. Indeed, a more gradual 
phase-in period can enable banks to adjust to the new capital ratios in a least costly manner, such 
as through accumulating capital via retained earnings.   The Basel Committee has stretched the 
full implementation of the capital ratios until 2019.  However, there are indications that market 
pressures may lead banks to adopt these regulations at a faster pace. 
Finally, the capital markets response as banks issue new equity will matter also.   The IIF 
report assumes that the capital markets response is less elastic, which leads to a higher cost of 
equity.  Much of this uncertainty is also subject to the strength of the recovery following the 
global financial crisis. In fact, the impact from higher lending rates and lower credit availability 
on economic activity is itself subject to uncertainty.  The magnitude of the latter will depend, for 
instance, on the availability of different sources of financing.  In countries where capital markets 
can provide an alternative source of financing, at least for large enterprises, the impact could be 
less.    Moreover, the response of monetary authorities to any regulatory induced economic 
slowdown (and of course the scope there is for such a response) would also make a difference. 
 
 
                                                           
2 See IIF 2010 b page 20. 
3 In an idealized world where the conditions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem hold, this effect is just enough to 
offset the increased weight of the more expensive equity in the capital structure so that the overall cost of capital 
stays fixed as the bank’s leverage varies. 6 
 
Table 1. Short-Term Impact of Basel III in Advanced Economies 










        Increase in 
rates (bps 
Decline  in 
activity (pp) 
MAG  15.4   -0.16  (four and 
a half years 
after 
implementation) 
1 percentage point increase in 
common equity ratio, implemented 
over four years.  
15-90   0.16-1.8  
IIF  132 bps  -0.60   Package of regulations including a 
2 percentage point rise in common 
equity ratio, capital redefinition 
effects and higher liquidity 
requirements.  
66-396   0.3-1.8  
1/ The range depends on how much capital adjustment is needed from a 1 percentage point increase to a 6 
percentage point increase. The range of both the increase in interest rates and the decline in economic activity is 
obtained by taking the estimated impact under each study; namely, a 1 percentage point increase in common equity 
ratio and multiplying this by 1-6 percentage points.  
 
In sum, while the magnitude is subject to considerable uncertainty, there is agreement 
that there is likely to be some short-term impact in countries adopting Basel III.
4  To the extent 
that this  short-term  impact materializes, emerging markets  are likely  to  be  affected through 
several channels even if one excludes the  impact from emerging markets themselves adopting 
Basel III regulations (Figure 1).  Two of these channels are of particular importance.  The first, 
which could be referred as the trade  flows channel, acts  through lower economic activity in 
advanced economies and consequent lower import activity on their part.  This is the effect on 
advanced economies itself that transmist to emerging markets through lower trade activity.   The 
quantitative impact of this channel  depends on trade income elasticities.   The second channel, 
which we will refer to as the  financial flows channel, is through higher interest rates and the 
decline in  banking flows  from advanced economies to emerging markets .    The quantitative 
impact  will  depend,  inter  alia,  on  interest  rate  differentials,  global  risks,  and  the  overall 
dependence on such flows.  
In turn, within the financial flows channel, there is a direct lending effect—lower lending 
from banks in advanced economies to non-banks in emerging markets—and an indirect lending 
effect—lower lending from banks in advanced economies to banks in emerging markets.  These 
effects might reinforce each other in the presence of agency problems in financial markets due to 
asymmetric information and costliness of enforcing contracts.  For instance, the curtailment of 
direct loans to firms in emerging markets could lead to a further decline in investment, economic 
activity and asset prices.  Specifically, if collateral is an important determinant in banks’ lending 
decisions, as is generally the case in emerging markets as a result of the costs of enforcing 
contracts, the decline in asset prices can reduce domestic bank lending. This reinforces the initial 
                                                           
4 In the medium to long-term, banks would only face the stock costs of holding higher capital. The BIS has also 
undertaken a long-term impact study in which they consider both the benefits and the costs of the new regulations. It 
thus assesses the shift from one steady state to another (with and without reforms) once the transition to the higher 
capital standards has been achieved. They find that a one percentage point increase in the capital requirement 
translates into a 0.09 percent median loss in the level of steady state output. But there are of course benefits from 
holding higher capital in as much as it succeeds in lowering the frequency and severity of financial crises. 7 
 
decline in  direct  lending from  banks  in  advanced economies.   The impact  of the decline in 
lending by banks in emerging markets will also depend on the degree to which other forms of 
financing are or not available to borrowers.  For instance, small and medium enterprises might 
not be able to offset the decline in bank lending, given their lack of access to stock or bond 
markets.  
Figure 1. Short-Term Impact on Emerging Markets of Proposed Basel III Regulations 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration 
 
Based on an analysis of the determinants of banking flows from advanced to emerging 
markets, which includes an assessment of the nature of the financial linkages between these two 
groups of countries, this paper examines the impact of the regulatory changes under Basel III.  
We focus exclusively on the financial flows channel, through both direct and indirect lending.  
Examining the links between advanced and emerging markets, and how these may affect the 
magnitude of banking flows, is warranted in light of the following two observations.  
  International banks have played a critical role in transferring capital from rich to poor 
countries, which in turn has aided the income convergence process observed in some 
emerging markets. As shown in Figure 2, there have been unusually sharp increases in 
these flows during the new millennium, particularly in regions where banking flows have 
played a dominant role in the years that preceded the crisis.  
  Banking  flows  were  an  important  transmission  channel  of  the  global  financial  crisis 
(Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2010) even if in some regions, in particular emerging Europe, 8 
 
the  reversal  of  banking  flows  was  not  as  marked  as  the  unprecedented  inflows  that 
preceded the crisis period would have suggested. 
 
These  observations  would  suggest  that  the  nature  of  the  financial  linkages  between 
advanced  and  emerging  markets,  which  are  also  likely  to  vary  by  region,  can  be  important 
determinants of banking flows.  An analysis of the potential implications of Basel III for banking 
flows to emerging markets would therefore also need to take into account the nature of these 
financial linkages between countries and this is one of the goals pursued by this paper. 
Figure 2. Changes in External Positions of Reporting Banks vis-à-vis EMEs—2000-09  
(in percent of GDP; exchange rate adjusted changes) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF data (2011) and, for banking flows (net), the BIS locational statistics. 
 
To this end, we rely on a detailed dataset of bilateral banking flows between 17 advanced 
economies and 38 emerging markets.  This bilateral dataset allows us to construct indicators of 
financial interconnectedness both from the perspective of the country providing the capital and 
the country receiving the capital.  In effect, this allows us to extend the literature on capital flows 
which, given the aggregate nature of the data used, cannot capture bilateral linkages.  Based on 
this bilateral data, we address the following two key questions:  
  What are the determinants of banking flows?  In particular, what role does the nature of 
financial linkages play in determining the magnitude of these banking flows?  Specifically,   
o  The standard literature assumes that the key financial linkage is through interest rate 
differentials, adjusted for exchange rate movements (in nominal terms) as this 
determines the expected rate of return.
5   
                                                           
5 One aspect not covered among the determinants of banking flows relates to the medium-term strategic goals that 
parent banks might be pursuing and how this affects banking flows. Given the aggregate nature of our dataset this is 
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o  But, beyond this, does the magnitude of banking flows depend on the financial 
relationship or links between the home country (lender or capital provider) and the 
host (borrower or capital recipient) country?  
o  Also important is the extent to which the flows to emerging markets are affected by a 
portfolio rebalancing (or contagion) effect (banks in a home country reduce lending 
to all emerging markets when they are exposed to a country in crisis)?   
  Based on these key determinants of banking flows to emerging markets, the second main 
question we pursue relates to the likely impact of the adoption of the proposed Basel III 
capital requirements in advanced economies on the banking flows to emerging markets?  
 
IV.  Methodology and Data 
The empirical work in our paper relies on a dataset of annual bilateral banking flows and 
combines  the  work  in  the  literature  on  capital  flows  as  well  as  the  literature  on  financial 
interconnectedness.  As Kim et al. (2011), we focus first on global push and local pull factors.  
Given the bilateral nature of our dataset, however, we also expand the coverage of determinants 
to include aggregate features in the relationship between countries, as well as the factors that 
might reflect the depth of their financial relationship and their response to crisis developments. 
The analysis is based on an unbalanced panel of bilateral banking flows from advanced 
countries to emerging markets.  The data is taken from the BIS locational banking statistics; it 
comprises gross international financial claims of banks resident in a given country on the bank 
and the non-bank sector of emerging markets.  This series differs from the BIS consolidated 
banking data in three important respects.  First, it reports the creditor data based on a residence 
(host  country)  basis  as  opposed  to  a  nationality  (home  country)  basis.    Second,  and  most 
importantly  for  our  purposes,  information  on  the  flows  between  parent  banks  and  emerging 
market subsidiaries are not excluded in the locational data as is the case in the BIS consolidated 
data.  Finally, the BIS locational data are more relevant for countries receiving external loans 
because the way this database measures lending flows is consistent with balance of payments 
statistics, which in turn allows for a better matching of cross border flows and of the various 
macroeconomic and financial system characteristics of emerging markets.  
The dependent variable is the log of the change in the external position of reporting banks 
in an advanced economy i (i=1,.., 17) vis-à-vis emerging market j (j=1,.., 38) at time t (t=1990,.., 
2009).    The  dependent  variable  enters  our  regressions  as  changes  in  the  external  positions 
adjusted for the exchange rate valuation in a given year.  Since the dependent variable can in 
principle take negative values (e.g., whenever country i provides some positive amount of loans, 
but these are smaller than the repayments by country j to country i), we follow the method 
proposed  by  Papaioannou  (2009),  and  also  used  by  Herrmann  and  Mihaljek  (2010),  when 
applying logs to the changes in external positions.  Specifically, when the dependent variable 
adopts negative values, we take the logarithm of the absolute value and assign to it a negative 
value.  This transformation preserves the original variable sign and retains the symmetry in the 
data.  As shown in Table 2, the dependent variable has a broadly similar number of positive and 
negative values and, unlike bilateral trade flows, the share of zero values in the sample is quite 
small. 10 
 
Several potential determinants of banking flows are explored.  The literature examining 
these flows is not as developed as the literature on capital flows, in part because data on banking 
flows is not as readily available.  As with capital flows more generally, banking flows are in part 
determined  by  global  push  factors.    This  includes  a  number  of  global  channels,  from 
developments  in  real  US  interest  rates  to  alternative  measures  of  risk  appetite  and  market 
volatility, as well as world real GDP and trade volumes growth.  Also crucial for capital flows, 
and banking flows are a priori no exception, are factors in the capital recipient country that 
impact the behavior of capital providers—the local (or domestic) pull factors.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable 
 
 
Moreover, given the bilateral nature of the BIS locational dataset, issues specific to the 
links or relationships between pairs of countries (lenders and borrowers) of both a non-financial 
and  a  financial  nature  are  considered.    Non-financial  links  include  bilateral  differences  in 
economic  size  and  growth,  in  part  because  these  can  reflect  the  relative  attractiveness  of 
remaining within the home (lender) country versus lending to a host (borrower) country.  Finally, 
given the increasing importance of cross-border financial links, and the obvious role these should 
play in determining banking flows, four factors that reflect the more detailed financial links 
between lenders and borrowers should be considered.  
First, a key factor is the role of interest differentials.  Capital can be expected to flow in 
response to higher interest rates in emerging markets (positive interest rate differential), though 
this  should  also  be adjusted for nominal  exchange rate depreciation  in  the emerging market 
currency over the period ahead as what matters for the lender is the expected rate of return in his 
currency; thus, we control for non-lagged changes in bilateral exchange rates. 
Second,  the  exposure  of  a  lender  country’s  banking  sector  to  individual  emerging 
markets.  In other words, the measure of bilateral relationship that is of relevance for lenders.  As 
always,  however,  there  is  a  trade-off  in  this  relationship.    There  are  pros  and  cons  of 
concentration in banking activities; the former in terms of extraordinary profits that come from 
having a dominant role in the sector and the latter in terms of risks from lack of diversification.  
Third,  the  dependence  of  an  emerging  market  to  a  specific  advanced  economy  also 
matters.  This is a measure of the bilateral relationship of relevance to borrowers.  For example, 
while  4  percent  of  Sweden’s  global  exposures  have  Estonia  as  a  destination,  for  the  latter 
Sweden represents 68 percent of all its sources of banking flows. In this context, other lenders 
might view excessive concentration as a risk factor and thus choose to stay away from this 
country—diversification is a magnet, concentration is not for new lenders.  
Fourth, the impact on banking flows to emerging markets as a result of developments in 
other  emerging  markets  also  needs  to  be  considered.    Since  few  emerging  markets  are 
interconnected  among  them,  this  occurs  through  a  rebalancing  process  in  the  advanced 
economies themselves.  In particular, a lender’s exposure to a crisis hit emerging market could 
trigger a reassessment of risk of lending to all other emerging markets and the need to shore up 
resources—both of which could be expected to affect banking flows to emerging markets.  
Variable Obs Share Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Less than zero 2903 37 -3.71 1.92 -10.11 -0.10
Zero 1138 15
Greater than zero 3762 48 4.29 1.98 0.10 10.2411 
 
Given the above discussion, we may group the independent variables into four categories: 
(i) global push factors; (ii) local (or domestic) pull factors; (iii) lender-borrower links that do not 
pertain  to  the  financial  relationship  among  them;
6  and  (iv) variables that capture  bilateral 
financial  relationships,  including  interest  differentials  adjusted  for  bilateral  exchange  rate 
changes, as well as lender-specific (home country) and borrower-specific (host country) banking 
exposure factors.  We also explore, admittedly in a limited manner, the possible role of  re-
balancing style contagion that materializes through banking flows.  Most regressors, except for 
the global factors, enter the estimation as one year lags ; another exception  is the re-balancing 
(contagion) variable, which we examine both in its lagged and non-lagged specification.  A more 
detailed discussion of determinants of banking flows now follows. 
Global push factors. We include in the regressions the (log of) S&P500 volatility index 
of the Chicago Board Options Exchange, a measure that is typically used as an indicator of 
expected short-term uncertainty in global financial markets.  The expected sign of this coefficient 
is negative—greater uncertainty should reduce banking flows.  We also experimented with other 
global indicators, such as world real GDP and trade volumes growth and real US interest rates, as 
well as measures of risk aversion such as the difference between alternative measures of 10-year 
interest rates and US treasuries.  The conclusions remain largely unchanged. 
Variables that capture local (or domestic) pull factors.  We include measures at the 
host or borrower country level which are of an aggregate (economy wide) nature and aim at 
capturing broad macroeconomic conditions as well as the borrower’s structural characteristics.  
As  a  measure  of  initial  conditions  we  include  the  degree  of  trade  openness.  Under  the 
macroeconomic conditions we include the lagged current account balance as a percentage of 
GDP and the lagged fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP.
7  The sign on the coefficient on the 
current account balance is ambiguous.  On the one hand, a negative coefficient could be expected 
in that a higher current account balance  in the past  means that less borrowing is required to 
finance the current account; in other words, there is a certain persistence in the determinants of 
capital flows.  On the other hand, a positive coefficient could be expected if the current account 
balance is seen by lenders as a measure of the strength of the countries macro fundamentals (so a 
higher current account balance is associated with stability and thus more financing is likely to be 
made available).    The  coefficient on the fiscal balance is expected to be positive on the 
assumption that the fiscal balance is a measure of the s trength of macroeconomic policies.  For 
instance, a higher fiscal balance is expected to be correlated with a lower probability of default.   
Needless to say, as with the current account, the opposite is also possible.  
We also include the lagged Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) exchange rate regime index.  A 
high index reflects a more flexible exchange rate system.   The coefficient on the exchange rate 
regime is expected to be negative; namely, the more flexible the exchange rate, the more 
uncertain are the lender’s returns and hence the lower are the cross border flows.  
As to structural factors, we include the lagged Chinn-Ito index as a de jure measure of 
capital account openness.  The higher the index, the greater the capital account openness; hence, 
the  coefficient  on  this  variable  is  also  expected  to  be  positive.    Other  structural  measures 
                                                           
6 Some authors, such as Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010), link these determinants to the kind of regressors used in 
gravity-type trade studies. As we discuss later, we find these transaction costs less important in financial flows as the 
cost of transport applies mostly only to trade flows. 
7 All lender and borrower regressors are included with a lag to minimize endogeneity concerns. 12 
 
considered  were  the  quality  and  stability  in  political  institutions  in  emerging  markets  as 
measured  by  the  International  Country  Risk  Guide  (ICRG)  index.    The  coefficient  on  this 
variable was positive.  More precisely, the more stable are a country’s political institutions, the 
larger the cross border flows to this country.  But it also restricted the sample size so we chose to 
drop it from our final specification.  Also, the ease of doing business might affect extrepreneurial 
activities more directly and banking activity indirectly; however, we did not pursue this aspect of 
underlying structural characteristics. 
Variables  that  capture  non-financial  bilateral  links.    Trade-related  gravity  models 
have been used to predict trade volumes.  They were first pioneered by Tinbergen in 1962 and, 
more recently, similar models have been used to predict bilateral population flows and financial 
asset flows.  We include two economic variables; the (log of) GDP per capita of the borrower 
(host) country and of the lender (home) country (in PPP terms) as a measure of relative country 
size, and the real  GDP  growth differential between the borrower and the lender.    Although 
gravity models generally postulate a positive coefficient for the size of the economy in both the 
lending  and borrowing  country, it can  be argued that  the larger is  a lender  country’s  home 
market, the less is its dependence on foreign markets (i.e., a negative coefficient).  Also, stronger 
growth in the borrower country is expected, ceteris paribus, to result in an increase in the loans to 
that country.  Thus, the coefficient on the growth differential (defined as the GDP growth rate of 
the borrower minus the GDP growth rate of the lender) is expected to be positive.  
We did not pursue, however, other gravity-type variables, such as common language and 
distance as is done by others to capture higher transaction costs (e.g., Herrmann and Mihaljek 
(2010)).  In our view, banking flows are less affected by variables that reflect transport costs; 
such  costs  should  not  be  as  important  for  financial  transactions.    In  contrast,  the  aggregate 
bilateral links are likely to be affected by indicators that relate to the flow of information. For 
example, we worked with the share of trade in total trade between two countries as well as the 
share of trade in indicators that could reveal more precisely the flow of information.  Among the 
latter we looked at the number of minutes in telephone conversations. But the direction of the 
flow of information is unclear.  For example, while the data allows us to capture who initiates the 
conversation,  the  information  flow  can  go  in  both  directions  once  the  connection  has  been 
established.  Also, we experimented with the share of bilateral newspaper trade in total news 
trade (and in total trade).  This allows for greater certainty with regard to the direction of the 
information. Both indicators had the expected sign (greater interconnection would lead to greater 
banking flows), but the resulting sample size was much smaller; thus, we did not pursue this 
further. 
Variables that capture financial linkages.  As noted before, the first variable in this 
category is the interest rate differential between the borrower and lender (difference in monetary 
market rates).  As in Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010), we look only at nominal (as opposed to 
real)  interest  rates  as  banks’  lending  decisions  are  assessed  in  such  way.    The  sign  on  this 
coefficient is expected to be positive: relatively higher interest rates in the borrower vis-à-vis the 
lender country is expected to lead to higher banking flows.  We include the percentage change in 
the bilateral exchange rate (where the exchange rate is defined as borrower’s currency to lender’s 
currency) as would be suggested for the interest parity condition to hold.  In other words, one 
would expect capital flows to increase in response to an increase in interest rate differentials 
(adjusted for nominal exchange rate depreciation in the period ahead (et+1/et) as what matters for 
the lender is the expected rate of return on his own currency.  This also serves to control for other 13 
 
underlying factors.  For example, a weaker currency in the borrower country could be expected, 
ceteris paribus, to reduce the flow of cross border loans (depreciation in the borrower’s currency 
lowers expected returns in the lender’s currency) as this would also make it more difficult for 
loans to be serviced; in sum, the expected sign of this regressor is negative.   
In addition, we expect that some proportion of the cross border banking flows will be 
determined by financial or banking sector developments in the lender country.  For instance, 
concentration in banking activities from the lender’s perspective provides opportunities but could 
also entail risks due to the lack of diversification.  To this end, we include the share of lending of 
any one advanced economy to each individual emerging market (e.g., the share of flows from 
Sweden to Latvia as a share of Sweden’s total lending).  Overall, we would expect that the risk 
of lack of diversification outweighs the opportunities of sector dominance.  This regressor should 
therefore be expected to have a negative coefficient. But the opposite coefficient is also possible. 
Some proportion of the cross border flows can also be expected to be determined by 
financial  or  banking  sector  developments  in  the  borrowing  country.    Here  too  we  focus  on 
concentration of flows from a few sources, but viewed this time from the borrower’s perspective.  
The concentration in the financial relationship of emerging markets can be picked in a number of 
ways.  We choose to include a variable that is the share of flows from a source or home country 
in a particular emerging or host country as a share of total borrowing by the host country (e.g., 
flows from Sweden to Latvia as a share of Latvia’s total borrowing).  The coefficient is expected 
to be negative.  In other words, excessive exposure would be a disincentive for banking flows. It 
could  also  have  the  opposite  sign  if  one  considers  that  the  capital  providing  country  has 
developed a dependency.  However, we feel this is less likely as what is being captured here is 
the attractiveness of a recipient country as opposed to the willingness of capital providers. 
As to the role of contagion, we use a variable that was first used to our knowledge by 
Herrmann  and  Mihaljek  (2010).    Specifically,  a  dummy  variable  is  created  for  each  capital 
account crises over the past two decades and is in turn interacted with the share of each lender’s 
exposure  to  the  crisis  country  (or  groups  of  countries).    We  then  examine  how  this  affects 
banking flows.  We focus on both a contemporaneous and a lagged specification of this variable.  
The hypothesis is that being overly exposed to a crisis country (or groups of countries) leads to a 
re-balancing of a lender’s exposure, be it because of a new appreciation of risk or because of a 
need to shore up resources to confront the potential losses that might arise from these exposures. 
 
V.  Estimation Results 
The  econometric  work  is  carried  out  using  a  fixed  effects  estimator  with  clustered 
standard errors using both home and host fixed effects. Unlike Hermann and Mihaljek (2010) 
who use a similar dataset (their dataset, however, is based on quarterly rather than an annual 
frequency), the Hausman specification test shows that there is a systematic difference between 
the  fixed  and  random  effects  models.    We  add  one  at  a  time  each  of  the  four  groups  of 
determinants previously described to assess the impact on the aggregate specification and the 
stability of point estimates.  The end goal is to keep within each of the four groups of regressors 
we use (i.e., global push factors, local pull factors, bilateral non-financial links, and bilateral 
financial links) as parsimonious a specification as is deemed possible. 
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Exploring Traditional Determinants of Capital Flows 
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.  Column 5 presents the specification that 
drives the paper’s conclusions.  The R-squared is low as would be expected in a panel dataset as 
the variation across different data points at a point in time is usually greater than across time for 
any one subject (country pairs) in the dataset.  The coefficients are of the expected sign and, for 
the most part, statistically significant.  The variable measuring the developments in the global 
environment  (log  of  volatility  index)  is  negative  and  significant  at  the  1  percent  level—the 
greater the uncertainty in the global environment, the lower the cross-border flows (column 1).  
As noted earlier, we experimented with some of the other indicators of global conditions, such as 
real US interest rates and world GDP and trade growth.  The conclusions did not materially 
change. 
Table 3. Determinants of Banking Flows from Advanced to Emerging Markets 
 
The results on the host (emerging) economy pull factors are also largely as expected for 
initial conditions and macroeconomic variables (column 2).  The initial level of trade openness is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  On the macroeconomic side, the 
coefficient on the lagged current account balance is negative but not significant; namely, a higher 
balance results in lower financing needs, though the coefficient is weakly defined. In column 5, 
however, the regressor is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  The coefficient on the 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE FE FE
Global Push Local Pull Bilateral Financial Full
Factors Factors Links Links Model
S&P 500 volatility index, in logs -0.9101*** -0.5711***
[0.141] [0.134]
Trade openness in country j (% of GDP) 0.0040 0.0093**
[0.003] [0.005]
Exchange rate regime in country j (larger, more flexible) -0.3452*** -0.2620***
[0.060] [0.071]
Current account balance in country j (% of GDP) -0.0148 -0.0261*
[0.013] [0.014]
Fiscal balance in country j (% of GDP) 0.1294*** 0.0799***
[0.018] [0.021]
Capital account openness in country j (larger, more openness) 0.2580*** 0.2324***
[0.070] [0.071]
Per capita GDP, PPP, in country j, in logs 2.4700*** 1.2305**
[0.466] [0.541]
Per capita GDP, PPP, in country i, in logs -3.3452*** -2.5467***
[0.665] [0.843]
Differential real GDP growth between country j and country i (p.p.) 0.0976*** 0.0433***
[0.013] [0.014]
Differential interest rate between country j and country i (p.p.) 0.0115* 0.0312***
[0.006] [0.008]
Change in bilateral exchange rate (%, country i per country j) -0.0414*** -0.0366***
[0.004] [0.004]
Banking exposure to country j (% of total position of banks in country i) -0.7905*** -0.9421***
[0.293] [0.281]
Banking exposure to country i (% of total position in country j) -0.1449*** -0.1335***
[0.025] [0.023]
Number of Observations 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803
Number of Home-Host Pairs 553 553 553 553 553
R² (within) 0.007 0.026 0.018 0.047 0.072
Robust standard errors in between brackets. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the ***1, **5, and *10 percent level. Constant is not reported.15 
 
lagged fiscal balance is positive and significant at the 1 percent level.  Specifically, a higher 
fiscal balance results in higher cross-border flows as the fiscal balance is perhaps looked at as a 
measure of the strength of macroeconomic fundamentals.  The point estimate on the (lagged) 
exchange rate regime is negative, as expected, and significant at the 1 percent level.  
On the structural side, the lagged Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness is used. 
The higher the index, the greater the capital account openness—and the coefficient is indeed 
positive and statistically significant.  We also considered the ICRG average index; it is positive 
(a higher number corresponds to more predictable political institutions) and  also statistically 
significant.  It reduces however our sample size so we opt not to keep it in our final specification. 
The  variables  measuring  the  strength  of  the  non-financial  bilateral  ties  between  an 
advanced and emerging partner country all have plausible signs.  Larger per capita GDP in the 
home (advanced) country is associated with lower flows, while a larger per capita GDP in the 
host (emerging) country is associated with higher flows (and both are statistically significant).  
The addition of these variables is justified also as a scaling factor.  Similarly, the coefficient on 
the growth differential is of the expected sign (with higher relative growth in the host/emerging 
market being associated with higher flows) and also statistically significant.  
Exploring Financial Linkages 
The  next  step  is  to  discuss  the  indicators  that  represent  the  financial  linkages.    The 
coefficient on the interest differential—a standard determinant of banking flows—is as expected: 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level (that is, higher interest rate in the host market is 
associated with higher flows).  The coefficient on the nominal exchange rate is also, as expected, 
negative and significant—a depreciation of the emerging market currency reduces flows.  
The point estimates on the links between the home and host banking sectors offer some 
additional insights on financial interconnectedness.  The coefficient on the share of flows going 
to one particular emerging market relative to flows to all other emerging markets from any one 
advanced economy is negative and significant at the 1 percent level.  As mentioned earlier, the 
high exposure is both an opportunity (sector dominance) and a risk (lack of diversification)—the 
latter appears to be more important.  Also, from the perspective of the host country, the banking-
specific factors relate to the degree of dependence of banking operations.  As with the lending 
country, the more dependent is a country on a few source countries, the lower are the cross-
border flows.  Presumably, the more dependent a borrowing country is on a few originating 
sources, the riskier it is perceived by other lenders; this must dominate and explains the decline 
in volume of flows.  The coefficient is also statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Also of interest is the degree to which the impact of interconnectedness varies across 
regions.  To this end, Table 4 presents estimations that interact each of the banking-specific 
regressors  with  regional  dummies—a  EU10  dummy,  a  EU  candidates  dummy,  a  EU 
neighborhood dummy, a Latin American dummy, and a dummy for other emerging markets; the 
latter includes CIS countries that are not part of the EU neighborhood. The estimation follows 
column 5 in Table 3, but shows only the coefficients for each regional dummy together with the 
non-interacted  coefficient.    We  test  the  null  that  adding  both  coefficients  (the  stand  alone 
coefficient plus the interaction with the regional dummies) results in a statistically significant 
coefficient in an attempt to identify differences in financial interconnectedness across regions.  
The  expectation  is  that  this  will  tell  us  something  about  the  stability  of  funding  (advanced 
economy perspective) and the implications of dependence (emerging market perspective). 16 
 
It is worth noting that the home country exposure is not statistically significant among the 
EU10 and EU candidate countries, suggesting that excess exposure of lender countries might not 
trigger a meaningful decline in banking flows.  In contrast, the EU neighborhood, LAC countries 
and other emerging market economies do provide evidence of a greater role for diversification in 
exposures—as opposed to sector dominance.  This is consistent with the experience of emerging 
Europe during the global financial crisis.  Either because of the role of parent banks that wished 
to avoid a fire sale of assets or of the Vienna initiative (or most likely both), there is less of a 
decline in banking flows, at least relative to what might have been expected given the unusually 
large banking flows that preceded the crisis in this region.  The implication is that banking flows 
going to the EU10 and the EU candidate countries appear to be more stable. 
Table 4. Financial Linkages and Regional Factors 
 
In contrast, if a borrowing country is overexposed, this does result in lower banking flows 
in almost all the regions we have specified.  The one exception appears to be the EU candidate 
countries, which have a non significant combined coefficient.  Here too, however, it is worth 
noting that the coefficients in emerging Europe are smaller (and not significant among the EU 
candidates as already noted) than is the case for most emerging markets outside Europe.  For 
example, the combined coefficient for the EU10 countries is -0.082, and this is quite lower than 
the coefficient for other emerging markets where the combined coefficient is -0.277. 
What can be said about the importance of contagion and the rebalancing of exposures?  
The hypothesis we are exploring is that rebalancing takes place through an advanced economy so 
that those lending countries that are exposed to a crisis country are more likely to reduce their 
exposures elsewhere.  This could be both because of a re-assessment of risk or the need to shore 
up resources given the impact of the crisis on the lenders’ own worldwide balance sheet.  We 
pursue this question by adding to our main specification individual dummy variables constructed 
based on past capital account crises events that are, in turn, interacted with the exposure of each 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Full EU10 EU EU LAC Other
Model Countries Candidates Neighborhood Countries EMEs
Lender's (HOME) Perspective
Banking exposure to country j (% of total position of banks in country i) -0.9421*** -1.5920*** -0.8669*** -0.8708*** -0.9520*** -0.6764**
[0.281] [0.426] [0.278] [0.285] [0.345] [0.278]
- Interacted with Regional Dummy 1.3558*** -0.2358 -2.9489*** 0.3314 -1.7877**
[0.511] [1.104] [0.794] [0.566] [0.880]
- Sum of two coefficients -0.236 -1.103 -3.820*** -0.621*** -2.464***
- Test (H0: the sum is not statistically distinguishable from 0) (p-value) 0.39 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00
Borrower's (HOST) Perspective
Banking exposure to country i (% of total position in country j) -0.1335*** -0.1679*** -0.1644*** -0.1445*** -0.1079*** -0.0915***
[0.023] [0.031] [0.026] [0.027] [0.024] [0.024]
- Interacted with Regional Dummy 0.0859* 0.1875*** 0.0789* -0.2355*** -0.1849***
[0.048] [0.045] [0.043] [0.078] [0.060]
- Sum of two coefficients -0.082** 0.023 -0.066** -0.343 -0.277***
- Test (H0: the sum is not statistically distinguishable from 0) (p-value) 0.02 0.54 0.05 0.16 0.00
Number of Observations 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803
Number of Home-Host Pairs 553 553 553 553 553 553
R² (within) 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
Robust standard errors in between brackets. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the ***1, **5, and *10 percent level. Constant is not reported.17 
 
lender country to the corresponding crisis country (Table 5).
8  We focus on the following capital 
account crises events: Mexico (1995), East Asian (1998), Russia (1999), Turkey (2001), and 
Argentina (2002), as well as eleven capital account crises events identified in Ghosh et al. 
(2008).
9  The individual dummies are timed, with one exception, based on the year in which the 
reversal in current account deficits occurred.  The exception is Ghosh et al., which is timed based 
on an index of market pressures. Both contemporaneous and lagged interactions are examined. 
Table 5. Contagion Effects of Past Capital Account Crises 
 
The main conclusion from these estimations is that quite a few of these crises appear to 
have had a contagion and rebalancing effect that was durable enough to be picked up in annual 
data; namely, Russia, East Asia, Turkey, and the capital account crises episodes in Ghosh et al. 
(2008).  There are a few exceptions, however.  The Mexico crisis appears to have the wrong 
sign, perhaps because this crisis had a large domestic financing feature through the so-called 
tesobono crisis—local currency bonds indexed to the Mexican peso-US dollar exchange rate.  
The coefficients also seem to suggest that a few of these crises were more marked than the 
others.  For instance, the East Asian and the Turkey crises seem to have had a deeper impact than 
the Russia crisis—and the duration of the Turkey crisis extends beyond one year.  An alternative 
interpretation, however, is that the timing of these crises might also play a role as some have 
occurred late in the calendar year and thus might impact data in our empirical work covering 
more than one year.  The use of quarterly data would in principle enable a more accurate timing 
of the contagion effects of capital account crises episodes—a subject for future research. 
 
                                                           
8 For simplicity in the presentation, all the regressors not related to financial linkages are excluded from the table. 
9 The capital account crises covered in Ghosh et al. (2008) include: Argentina (2001), Brazil (1998), Bulgaria 
(1996), Ecuador (2000), Indonesia (1997), Korea (1997), Malaysia (1997), Russia (1998), Thailand (1997), Turkey 
(2000), and Uruguay (2002). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Non-lag Lagged Non-lag Lagged Non-lag Lagged Non-lag Lagged Non-lag Lagged Non-lag Lagged
Banking exposure to country j (% of -0.949***-0.9553*** -0.914*** -0.936*** -0.905*** -0.924*** -0.918*** -0.931*** -0.946*** -0.942*** -0.966*** -0.814***
  total position of banks in country i) [0.281] [0.281] [0.279] [0.281] [0.275] [0.279] [0.279] [0.279] [0.281] [0.281] [0.284] [0.268]
Banking exposure to country i (% of -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.134*** -0.133*** -0.135*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.133*** -0.136***
  total position in country j) [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
Common Lender Effect:
- Mexico (1995) 0.919 2.450***
[1.520] [0.535]
- Russia (1999) -1.720*** -0.837
[0.338] [1.176]
- East Asia (1998) -4.515* -2.847
[2.737] [2.043]
- Turkey (2001) -6.285** -3.929**
[2.505] [1.932]
- Argentina (2002) 1.328 0.989
[2.606] [3.479]
- Countries in Ghosh et al. (2006) 0.377 -2.340***
[0.747] [0.606]
Number of Observations 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803
Number of Home-Host Pairs 553 553 553 553 553 553 553 553 553 553 553 553
R² (within) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
Robust standard errors in between brackets. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the ***1, **5, and *10 percent level. Constant is not reported.
Crisis Episodes
Mexico Russia East Asia Turkey Argentina Ghosh et al. (2006)18 
 
VI. Discussion 
Contribution of Different Determinants of Banking Flows—2008 Crisis and Beyond 
In order to examine the contribution during the 2008 crisis of the different factors that 
impact banking flows, we begin by calculating the sensitivity of these flows to shocks in each of 
the four groups of regressors we have defined.  We do so by running the same fixed effects 
estimation after normalizing all the variables so that we can interpret each estimated coefficient 
as a standardized coefficient.  This allows us to add the coefficients within each of the four 
groups  of  determinants  and  explore  their  economic  significance  after  assuming  each  has 
improved by the same amount—say, a 1 percent positive shock, as we do in Table 6.  The main 
conclusion is that financial interconnectedness indeed plays, ceteris paribus, an important role in 
determining  banking  flows—a  0.67  percent  change  for  each  1  percent  change  in  financial 
interconnectedness.  Domestic and bilateral factors are also quite important; respectively, 0.36 
and 0.41 percent for each 1 percent change.  Global factors are less important, however, at least 
judging  by  their impact  after  a 1 percent  shock (only 0.05 percent).    At  any point in  time, 
however, the overall impact on an economy will depend also on the actual size of the economic 
shock that affects each of these banking flow determinants. 
Table 6. Banking flows and Sensitivity to Shocks 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
As to the question on the determinants of banking flows during the global financial crisis, 
we carry-out two different exercises (Figure 3).  In the first we look at the determinants of 
banking flows during 2008, which by most accounts was when global factors deteriorated the 
most, relative to their average values over the period 1990-2008.  In the second, the comparison 
is relative to the values of banking flows determinants in 2007; that is, prior to the crisis.  The 
latter is the correct comparison if the purpose is to understand what drove the impact of the 
crisis.  Clearly, what matters here is the value of the regressors in 2008 relative to one of the two 
benchmarks and one would expect global factors to play a key role.  And indeed this is the case.  
The increase in market volatility explains close to 76 percent of the decline in banking flows in 
2008.  Financial interconnectedness also had a negative impact (some 35 percent, slightly less 




S&P 500 volatility index, in logs 7,803 2.98 0.36 2.45 3.69 -0.0507 Global Push 0.05
Trade openness in country j (% of GDP) 7,803 81.29 44.59 12.10 220.41 0.1011
Exchange rate regime in country j (larger, more flexible) 7,803 2.40 1.10 1.00 5.00 -0.0706
Current account balance in country j (% of GDP) 7,803 -1.98 5.96 -26.88 18.04 -0.0380
Fiscal balance in country j (% of GDP) 7,803 -2.34 3.66 -21.70 8.94 0.0714
Capital account openness in country j (larger, more openness) 7,803 0.18 1.37 -1.81 2.54 0.0775
Per capita GDP, PPP, in country j, in logs 7,803 8.83 0.69 6.66 10.29 0.2072
Per capita GDP, PPP, in country i, in logs 7,803 10.21 0.26 9.49 10.88 -0.1600
Differential real GDP growth between country j and country i (p.p.) 7,803 2.44 4.44 -18.71 17.11 0.0469
Differential interest rate between country j and country i (p.p.) 7,803 8.58 14.99 -10.31 100.00 0.1142
Change in bilateral exchange rate (%, country i per country j) 7,803 7.09 16.96 -20.04 98.80 -0.1513
Banking exposure to country j (% of total position of banks in country i) 7,803 0.21 0.51 0.00 7.54 -0.1172
Banking exposure to country i (% of total position in country j) 7,803 4.92 8.94 -0.02 86.41 -0.2913
Impact of 1% positive 











than half of what was explained by global developments).  It is worth noting that domestic pull 
factors in fact played a supportive role leading to an increase in flows of little over 10 percent. 
Figure 3. Contribution of Different Factors during the 2008 Crisis (% of total change) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Possible Impact of Basel III on Banking Flows 
Based on the regression results in Table 3 (column 5), it is possible to simulate the likely 
impact of increases in lending rates in advanced economies of the kind discussed in Table 1.  
Since the reliance of each region on banking flows is quite different, the impact also varies 
across regions.  Of course these simulations should be viewed with caution as they assume there 
are no other changes.  For instance, the implicit assumption is that the behavioral responses will 
remain  as  valid  even  after  a  structural  change  of  the  kind  introduced  by  the  new  Basel  III 
requirements.  Moreover, the calculations do not control for a reassessment of risks in emerging 
market economies following the global financial crisis.  In fact, it could be argued that on this 
count alone capital flows are likely to be much more subdued than in the pre-crisis period. 
Disregarding these caveats, we expect that emerging markets will record a decline of 3 
percent in banking inflows for each 100 basis points decline in interest differentials—a change in 
line with the MAG and IIF reports.  At the level of each region, the aggregate impact depends 
also on the reliance of individual countries on banking flows prior to the crisis.   Again, we 
choose two different scenarios: the first is relative to the average inflows during the 2006-08 
period and the second is relative to the average inflows of 2007, and in both cases we assume 
different  declines  in  interest  differentials;  namely,  50,  100,  and  200  basis  points.    Not 
surprisingly, the impact varies  significantly  across  regions,  ranging  from  ¼ percent  of GDP 
among the EU10 to negligible levels in the EAP and LAC regions (Figure 4, Panels A and B).
10  
Thus, for some regions, emerging Europe in particular, the impact is not negligible and this  
would add to the likely broader reassessment of emerging markets risk mentioned earlier. 
                                                           
10 The average inflows to emerging Europe over the 2006-08 period was about 7 percent of GDP, thus resulting in a 
decline of 0.28 percent of GDP for each 100 basis point decline in interest differentials. This assumes, however, that 
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Figure 4. Potential Impact of Basel III in Banking Flows to Emerging Markets (% of GDP) 
Panel A. Based on Average Banking Flows (2006-08)  Panel B. Based on Banking Flows in 2007 
   
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
VII.   Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the main drivers of banking flows to emerging markets.  In addition 
to examining the global ―push‖ factors that capture the global environment and the domestic 
―pull‖ factors that are important in determining banking flows, we focus on the specific linkages 
between country pairs of lenders and borrowers that matter for banking flows.  In particular, we 
explore the degree to which the financial interconnectedness among countries impacts banking 
flows as well as any observed differences across regions.  Two such indicators are explored.  The 
first relates to the degree to which exposure of a lending country to a specific borrowing country 
is a disincentive to lend (home country exposure).  While on average this is the case in emerging 
markets, an interesting finding is that this exposure is not statistically significant among the 
EU10 and EU candidate countries.  That is to say concentration of the lender’s portfolio in an 
EU10 or EU candidate borrower country is not a disincentive for lending, but such concentration 
does  appear  to  reduce  banking  flows  in  other  regions  (EU  neighborhood,  LAC  and  other 
emerging markets).  This would suggest that the nature of interconnectedness or commitment 
may be stronger in the EU10 and EU candidate countries.  While we cannot examine further the 
factors behind this result, it is possibly due to the important role of parent banks in this region 
that enhance the relations-based financing aspects and thus provide greater stability to banking 
flows.
11  Indeed, this observation is consistent with the developments during the 2008 global 
financial crisis, where given the unusually large banking flows that preceded the crisis, one may 
have expected a larger decline once the crisis erupted than what occurred in practice.   
Another interesting result relates to the reliance of borrowers to few lenders for  banking 
flows—the host country exposure.  Here too, we would expect this to act as a disincentive for 
new  flows  and  indeed  this  is  the  case  in  all  regions  (except,  marginally,  among  the  EU 
candidates).  However, judging for the magnitude of individual coefficients, it is worth noting 
that this disincentive does not appear to be as strong among emerging Europe countries. 
The paper also looks at the extent to which portfolio rebalancing and contagion takes 
place through advanced economies themselves following a capital account crisis in an emerging 
market to which an advanced economy is exposed.  The indicator used allows us to assess the 
depth of the exposure of any one advanced economy to the emerging market facing a capital 
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account crisis.  We find that quite a few of the previous capital account crises have resulted in 
portfolio rebalancing; that is, banking flows to other emerging markets have fallen following a 
crisis in one emerging market, though the strength of the link varies across these episodes.  
We also examine the role of the different factors in affecting banking flows during the 
2008 global financial crisis.  As expected, the bulk of the decline in banking flows to emerging 
markets was on account of global developments.  But an important additional role was played by 
financial interconnectedness. In contrast, local pull factors on average played a supportive role. 
Also, based on the estimated relationship of the different drivers, we analyze the likely 
(short-term) impact of the increase in  capital requirements of  Basel  III on banking flows to 
emerging markets.  The increase in capital that will be needed in response to the full set of 
regulatory changes and the consequent impact of the higher capital on lending rates, lending 
volumes and economic activity in advanced economies is still highly uncertain.  This paper finds 
that a 100 basis points increase in the lending rates of advanced economies (i.e. a 100 basis 
points  decline  in  the  interest  differential  between  the  emerging  markets  and  advanced 
economies) would result in a 3 percentage point decline in banking flows to emerging markets 
through what we have referred to as the financial flows channel.  Given the differences across 
regions in terms of their reliance on banking flows, the level impact varies across regions; at 
most, it would average about ¼ percent of GDP among the EU10 countries.  
Finally, the fact that banking flows seem to be more stable in some regions brings to the 
fore the role of foreign capital (and foreign savings) in growth.  There is an extensive literature 
suggesting  that  foreign  savings  are  detrimental  for  growth.    They  are  said  to  substitute  for 
national savings and thus have a limited impact on long-run growth (e.g., Aizenman et al., 2007).  
The usual explanation is that the absorptive capacity of developing countries remains limited 
despite  the  availability  of  financing  and,  as  a  result,  foreign  savings  only  trigger  a  real 
overvaluation of the currency, which in turn weakens the profitability of investment.  The fact 
that there are differences across regions in the stability of banking flows would suggest that 
under certain conditions capital flows (and foreign savings) might support growth outcomes; this 
is a subject that requires further research. 
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Appendix 1. Proposed Basel III Reforms 
The proposed Basel III reforms aim to strengthen micro-prudential regulation (to help raise the resilience of 
individual banking institutions) and macro-prudential  regulations (to address system-wide risks which can 
build up across the banking sector as well as the pro-cyclical amplification of these risks over time).  While the 
cornerstone  of  the  reforms  is  stronger  capital  and  liquidity  requirements,  these  are  being  buttressed  by 
measures to improve supervision, risk management and governance, as well as transparency and disclosure.  
The measures which have already been agreed by the Committee and the Governors and Heads of Supervision 
(September 2010) include: 
  Strengthening the quality, consistency and transparency of capital to ensure that banks are better able 
to absorb losses.  Tier 1 capital will need to be predominately in the form of common shares and 
retained earnings, Tier 2 capital instruments will be harmonized and Tier 3 capital will be eliminated.  
  Raising the level of the minimum capital requirements.  Under the current Basel II, core and regular 
Tier 1 capital are 2 and 4 percent.  Under Basel III, core Tier 1 capital will rise to 4.5 percent and Tier 
1 capital will rise to 6 percent.  The phased in period is as follows: core Tier 1 capital in January 2013 
to 3.5 percent, January 2014 to 4 percent, and January 2015 to 4.5 percent.  The difference between 
the total capital requirement of 8 percent and the Tier 1 requirement can be met with Tier 2 capital.  
Also, a capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent on top of Tier 1 is to be introduced to ensure that 
banks maintain capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic 
stress.  While banks are allowed to draw on the buffer during such periods, the closer their regulatory 
capital  ratios  approach  the  minimum  requirement,  the  greater  the  constraints  will  be  on  earnings 
distributions. (Currently, under Basel II, there is no capital conservation buffer).  Capital conservation 
buffer beginning in Jan 2016 to 0.625 percent, January 2017 to 1.25 percent, Jan 2018 to 1.875 
percent and Jan 2019 to 2.5 percent.  Under Basel III total common equity requirement will rise to 7 
percent. 
  Increasing  the  risk  coverage  of  the  capital  framework,  in  particular  for  trading  activities, 
securitizations, exposures to off balance sheet vehicles and counterparty credit exposures arising from 
derivatives. 
  Introducing  an  internationally  harmonized  leverage  ratio  to  serve  as  a  backstop  to  the  risk-based 
capital measure and to contain the buildup of excessive leverage in the system.  
  Raising the standards for the supervisory review process (Pillar 2) and public disclosure (Pillar 3), 
together with additional guidance in the areas of sound valuation practices, stress testing, liquidity risk 
management, corporate governance and compensation; 
  Introducing minimum global liquidity standards consisting of both a short term liquidity coverage 
ratio and a longer term structural net stable funding ratio.  
  Promoting the build-up of capital buffers that can be drawn down in times of stress, including the 
capital conservation buffer mentioned above and a countercyclical buffer to protect the banking sector 
from periods of excessive credit growth.  The proposed countercyclical buffer will be within a range 
of 0-2.5 percent of common equity and will be implemented according to national circumstances.  
The Committee is also working with the FSB to address risks of systemically important banks—agreement has 
been reached between the Committee and the Governors and Heads of Supervision that these banks should 
have loss absorbing capacity beyond the minimum standards of the Basle III framework.  Going forward, the 
BCBS will also be working on a) a fundamental review of the trading book; b) a review of the use and impact 
of external ratings in the securitization capital framework; c) the treatment of large exposures; d) enhanced 
cross-border bank resolution; e) a review of the core principles for banking supervision to reflect the lessons of 
the crisis; and f) standards implementation and stronger collaboration among bank supervisors. 
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Appendix 2. Country Sample 
Home or reporting 
(country i) [17] 
Host or counterparty 
(country j) [38]  Region (for country j) 
Austria  Albania  EU Candidates 
Belgium  Argentina  LAC 
Denmark  Belarus  EU Neighborhood 
Finland  Brazil  LAC 
France  Bulgaria  EU10 
     
Germany  Chile  LAC 
Greece  China  EAP 
Italy  Colombia  LAC 
Japan  Croatia  EU Candidates 
Netherlands  Cyprus  Other Countries 
     
Norway  Czech Republic  EU10 
Portugal  Estonia  EU10 
Spain  Hungary  EU10 
Sweden  India  Other Countries 
Switzerland  Indonesia  EAP 
     
United Kingdom  Kazakhstan  Other Countries 
United States  Korea, Rep.  EAP 
  Latvia  EU10 
  Lithuania  EU10 
  Macedonia, FYR  EU Candidates 
     
  Malaysia  EAP 
  Mexico  LAC 
  Morocco  Other Countries 
  Peru  LAC 
  Philippines  EAP 
     
  Poland  EU10 
  Romania  EU10 
  Russian Federation  Other Countries 
  Serbia  EU Candidates 
  Slovak Republic  EU10 
     
  Slovenia  EU10 
  Taiwan, China  EAP 
  Thailand  EAP 
  Tunisia  Other Countries 
  Turkey  EU Candidates 
     
  Ukraine  EU Neighborhood 
  Venezuela, RB  LAC 
  Vietnam  EAP 
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Appendix 3. Definitions and Sources of Variables 
Variable  Definition and construction  Source 
     
Dependent Variable     
     
Change in external 
position 
Exchange-rate-adjusted change in external position of reporting banks in 
advanced country i (home) vis-à-vis emerging market j (host), expressed in 
millions of US$. 
BIS Locational 
Banking Statistics. 
     
Global Push Factor     
     
S&P 500 volatility 
index 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), end of year, in logs.  Bloomberg. 
     
Local Pull Factors     
     
Trade openness in 
country j 
Trade (sum of exports and imports) of goods and services, express as a 
percentage of GDP, in country j. 
IMF World 
Economic Outlook. 
     
Exchange rate regime 
in country j 
Exchange rate arrangements (coarse classification), ranging from 1 to 5: higher, 
more flexible. The original series goes up to 2007 and is extended by consulting 
several materials. 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004), and 
Ilzetzki, Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008).  
     
Current account 
balance in country j 
Current account balance, expressed as a percentage of GDP, in country j  IMF World 
Economic Outlook. 
     
Fiscal balance in 
country j 




     
Capital account 
openness in country j 
An index measuring the degree of capital account openness. Higher values 
reflect that a country if more open to capital transactions. The series goes to 
2008, and, for 2009, the values in 2008 are used. 
Chinn and Ito 
(2006 and 2008). 
     
Bilateral Links     
     
Per capita GDP, PPP, 
in country j 
Per capita GDP, PPP (international $), in country j, in logs.  IMF World 
Economic Outlook. 
     
Per capita GDP, PPP, 
in country i 
Per capita GDP, PPP (international $), in country i, in logs.  IMF World 
Economic Outlook. 
     
Differential real GDP 
growth between 
country j and country i 




     
Change in bilateral 
exchange rate 
Percentage change in nominal bilateral exchange rate. Bilateral exchange rate is 
defined as currency in country j per currency in country i. The methodology in 
Ghosh et al. (2005) is employed to adjust extreme values. 
IMF World 
Economic Outlook. 
     
Lender and Borrower 
Links 
   
     
Differential interest 
rate between country j 
and country i 
Nominal money market interest rate differential between country j and country i 
(i.e., interest rate in country j minus interest rate in country i), expressed in 
percentage points. Extreme values are adjusted, by following the methodology 
in Ghosh et al. (2005). 
IMF International 
Financial Statistics. 
   28 
 
Appendix 3. Definitions and Sources of Variables (continued) 
Variable  Definition and construction  Source 
 
Banking exposure to 
country j 
 
External position of reporting banks in country i vis-à-vis country j, expressed 




     
Banking exposure to 
country i 
External position of reporting banks in country i vis-à-vis country j, expressed 
as a percentage of total external position in country j. 
BIS Locational 
Banking Statistics. 
     
Common Lender 
Effects 
   
     
  External position of reporting banks in country i vis-à-vis crisis countries, as a 
percentage of total external position of reporting banks in country i. Crisis 
countries are as follows: 
BIS Locational 
Banking Statistics. 
     
Mexico  Mexico, in 1995.   
     
Russia  Russia, in 1999.   
     
East Asia  Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, in 1998.   
     
Turkey  Turkey, in 2001.   
     
Argentina  Argentina, in 2002.   
     
Europe  Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine, in 2008.   
     
Countries in Ghosh et 
al. (2008) 
Countries listed in Table 4.1 (p.21) in Ghosh et al. (2008).   
     
 